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ABSTRACT
The soft-bodied cephalopods including octopus, cuttlefish, and squid are broadly considered to be the most cognitively
advanced group of invertebrates. Previous research has demonstrated that these large-brained molluscs possess a suite of
cognitive attributes that are comparable to those found in some vertebrates, including highly developed perception,
learning, and memory abilities. Cephalopods are also renowned for performing sophisticated feats of flexible behaviour,
which have led to claims of complex cognition such as causal reasoning, future planning, andmental attribution. Hypoth-
eses to explain why complex cognition might have emerged in cephalopods suggest that a combination of predation, for-
aging, and competitive pressures are likely to have driven cognitive complexity in this group of animals. Currently, it is
difficult to gauge the extent to which cephalopod behaviours are underpinned by complex cognition because many of the
recent claims are largely based on anecdotal evidence. In this review, we provide a general overview of cephalopod cog-
nition with a particular focus on the cognitive attributes that are thought to be prerequisites for more complex cognitive
abilities. We then discuss different types of behavioural flexibility exhibited by cephalopods and, using examples from
other taxa, highlight that behavioural flexibility could be explained by putatively simpler mechanisms. Consequently,
behavioural flexibility should not be used as evidence of complex cognition. Fortunately, the field of comparative cogni-
tion centres on designing methods to pinpoint the underlying mechanisms that drive behaviours. To illustrate the utility
of the methods developed in comparative cognition research, we provide a series of experimental designs aimed at dis-
tinguishing between complex cognition and simpler alternative explanations. Finally, we discuss the advantages of using
cephalopods to develop a more comprehensive reconstruction of cognitive evolution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The study of complex cognition was traditionally confined to
primates because they were considered to be the pinnacle of
cognitive complexity (for a glossary of terms used herein, see
Table 1). Over the past 20 years, however, there has been
increasing evidence to suggest that distantly related large-
brained vertebrates, from cetaceans (Marino, 2002; Fox,
Muthukrishna, & Shultz, 2017) and elephants (Plotnik, de
Waal, & Reiss, 2006; Plotnik et al., 2011) to parrots
(Pepperberg, 2006; Pepperberg et al., 2013) and corvids
(Emery & Clayton, 2004; Clayton, Dally, & Emery, 2007;
Boeckle & Bugnyar, 2012), are capable of cognitive feats
comparable to those found in primates (Table 2). In particu-
lar, the discovery that corvids possess complex abilities that
match or exceed those exhibited by apes has prompted
important questions about the evolution of complex cogni-
tion. Despite diverging approximately 300 million years
ago, both apes and corvids demonstrate comparable cogni-
tive sophistication (Emery & Clayton, 2005; Güntürkün &
Bugnyar, 2016), which suggests that complex cognition
evolvedmultiple times, independently (Roth, 2015). Two dif-
ferent evolutionary processes have been proposed to explain
independently evolved yet similar traits. Comparable evolu-
tionary pressures can trigger the emergence of similar traits
either from the same underlying mechanisms through paral-
lel evolution or from different underlying mechanisms
through convergent evolution (Osvath, Kabadayi, &
Jacobs, 2014). Given the dramatic differences in brain anat-
omy and neuroarchitecture between apes and corvids
(Jarvis et al., 2005), it is unlikely that their cognitive similari-
ties have arisen from the same underlying mechanisms. For
example, the mammalian neocortex, involved in complex
cognitive abilities, is laminated whereby the cells are orga-
nised into layers, whereas the analogous brain structure in
birds (i.e. the avian pallium) is nucleated, whereby the cells
are organised into clusters. Such differences at the mechanis-
tic level suggest that cognitive traits in corvids that resemble
those found in apes are likely a result of convergent evolution
arising independently in response to similar evolutionary
pressures (Emery & Clayton, 2004; Seed, Emery, &
Clayton, 2009b).
Moving beyond vertebrates, new findings amongst inver-
tebrates provides further evidence that intelligence has
evolved independently multiple times. A substantial amount
of this evidence is emerging from one major group of inverte-
brates, the coleoid cephalopods, which diverged radically
from vertebrates over 550 million years ago (Fig. 1). The
coleoid cephalopods (henceforth cephalopods), which
include octopus, cuttlefish, and squid have the most centra-
lised and largest nervous system of all invertebrates, with a
brain to body size ratio greater than most fish and reptiles
(Packard, 1972; Nixon & Young, 2003). Such findings are
intriguing given that many of the molluscan relatives of ceph-
alopods, including gastropods and bivalves, have rudimen-
tary nervous systems (Nixon & Young, 2003; Zullo &
Hochner, 2011). Cephalopods also possess a suite of cogni-
tive attributes that are comparable to those found in some
vertebrates, including highly developed perception
(Wells, 1978; Abbott, Williamson, & Maddock, 1995;
Budelmann, 1995; Yang & Chiao, 2016; Hanlon &
Messenger, 2018), learning (Fiorito & Scotto, 1992;
Boal, 1996; Darmaillacq et al., 2004; Cole & Adamo, 2005;
Agin et al., 2006a; Darmaillacq, Dickel, & Mather, 2014;
Billard et al., 2020b) and memory abilities (Sanders, 1975;
reviewed in Agin et al., 2006b; Jozet-Alves et al., 2013). While
these mechanisms are not among those most often used as
evidence of complex cognition (Emery & Clayton, 2004),
many of them are considered to be vital precursors for com-
plex cognitive abilities such as causal reasoning, imagination,
mental time travel, and mental attribution (Table 1).
Although such complex abilities have primarily been demon-
strated in large-brained vertebrates, some cephalopods have
been reported performing sophisticated feats of flexible
behaviour that have led to postulations of complex cognition
(reviewed in Mather & Dickel, 2017; Amodio et al., 2019a,
2019b). For example, veined octopuses, Amphioctopus margina-
tus, have been observed carrying coconut shells around as
mobile dens, a behaviour that is thought to decrease the like-
lihood of predation as the coconut shells can be arranged into
a protective encasing (Finn, Tregenza, & Norman, 2009)
(Fig. 2). This has led to claims of future planning suggesting
that octopuses can envisage that the coconut shells will pro-
tect them from predators that they may encounter in the
future (Mather & Dickel, 2017; Mather, 2019).
The prospect that complex cognition emerged in cephalo-
pods challenges a fundamental aspect of our current under-
standing of cognitive evolution. Presently, it is thought that
environmental and social complexity has played key roles in
the evolution of complex cognition, driving the emergence
of flexible adaptive behaviour (i.e. behavioural flexibility).
Consequently, the leading hypotheses suggest that complex
cognition in large-brained vertebrates evolved under two
key pressures. The first, the Ecological Intelligence Hypothe-
sis, suggests that complex cognition emerged due to the phys-
ical demands of the environment, such as locating and
processing food as well as memorising when it would be opti-
mal to eat (i.e. fresh or ripe) (Milton, 1981; Gibson, 1986;
Rosati, 2017). The second, the Social Intelligence Hypothe-
sis, posits that complex cognition evolved to meet the chal-
lenges of living in a complex social group, such as the need
to outwit group members through manipulation or
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deception as a means of achieving higher social success and
monopolising more resources including food, shelter, and
mates (i.e. Machiavellian intelligence) (Jolly, 1966;
Humphrey, 1976; Byrne & Whiten, 1988). Moreover, indi-
viduals that live in complex social groups also need to form
and maintain social bonds (Dunbar, 1998), which has
facilitated the emergence of cooperative behaviours such as
group hunting, group defence, cooperative breeding, and
pro-social helping.
The prospect of complex intelligence arising in cephalo-
pods presents a challenge to this latter hypothesis because,
compared to large-brained vertebrates, many species evolved
in relatively simple social environments. For example, recog-
nition abilities of cephalopods are rather primitive
(Boal, 2006), there is no evidence of parental care, and
embryos tend to disperse after hatching (Hanlon &
Messenger, 2018). These life-history characteristics limit the
opportunity for social interactions between kin, as well as
the opportunity for forming strong social bonds, and restricts
their ability to foster cooperative behaviours (Schnell &
Clayton, 2019). It has recently been suggested that partially
different evolutionary pressures are likely to have played a
role in the evolution of cephalopod cognition (Amodio
et al., 2019a, 2019b). The immediate ancestors of cephalo-
pods relied on an external shell for protection as well as for
movement (i.e. the shell functioned as a buoyancy device).
The loss of this structure was followed by dispersed colonisa-
tion of diverse ecological niches ranging from tropical to
polar habitats, exposing soft-bodied cephalopods to a novel
array of foraging and predatory challenges. Soft-bodied
cephalopods are also faced with intense mating pressures.
Most species are short-lived (lifespans typically shorter than
two years) and have a single reproductive period in which
eggs are laid in a single or several temporally finite instances
(Rocha, Guerra, & González, 2001; Hanlon &
Messenger, 2018). A combination of limited breeding
periods, occasional post-mating cannibalism, and a highly
skewed operational sex ratio experienced by various species
results in fierce mating competition (Moynihan &
Rodaniche, 1982; Hanlon et al., 2005: Hanlon &
Forsythe, 2008; Morse & Huffard, 2019). These three pres-
sures – increased predation, increased foraging challenges,
and intense mating competition – are thought to have driven
the behavioural flexibility observed in cephalopods
(Hanlon &Messenger, 2018; Schnell & Clayton, 2019; Amo-
dio et al., 2019a, 2019b).
Behavioural flexibility is widely considered to be the gold
standard for evidence of complex cognition because it is
thought that flexible behaviours are underpinned by com-
plex cognitive abilities such as causal reasoning, imagination,
mental time travel, and mental attribution. Despite this
implicit assumption, several researchers have noted that
many examples of behavioural flexibility can be explained
by putatively simpler mechanisms (Mikhalevich, Powell, &
Logan, 2017). For example, in some cases, behavioural flex-
ibility might be underpinned by a hardwired predisposition
or achieved through associative learning (Table 1). Cur-
rently, it is difficult to gauge whether behavioural flexibility
in cephalopods is underpinned by complex cognition
because recent claims are based on anecdotal evidence rather
than empirical tests that control for the possibility of simpler
explanations (Amodio, 2019; Schnell & Clayton, 2019;
Schnell & Vallortigara, 2019). Thus, key questions remain
Table 1. Glossary of terms
Term Definition
Associative
learning
A process where an individual learns the
relationship between two cues; or a cue and
a behavioural response.
Behavioural
flexibility
The ability innovatively to modify behaviour
to respond effectively to novel situations.
Causal reasoning The process of identifying the relationship
between a cause and its effect.
Complex
cognition
The collection of complex cognitive abilities
including causal reasoning, imagination,
mental time travel, and mental attribution.
Conditioning Learning to respond to new stimuli using old
behaviours.
Episodic-like
memory
The ability to re-experience specific past
events based on what happened, where it
happened, and when.
Future planning The ability to plan for future contingencies to
fulfil future needs. Planning must be
spontaneous without relying on learnt
patterns and individuals must distinguish
current motivational states from future
states.
Hardwired
predisposition
Fixed action patterns triggered by a cue.
Imagination A process by which scenarios and situations
that are not currently available to
perception are formed in the mind’s eye to
facilitate innovative problem-solving.
Inferential
reasoning
The ability to select the correct alternative by
logically excluding other potential
alternatives.
Intelligence A suite of complex cognitive abilities including
causal reasoning, imagination, mental time
travel, and mental attribution. In this
review, this term is used interchangeably
with complex cognition.
Mental
attribution
The ability to attribute the perceptual or
attentional mental state of another
individual, recognising others as individuals
with their own thoughts, knowledge, and
desires different from their own (also termed
Theory of Mind).
Mental time
travel
The ability to travel backwards and forwards
in the mind’s eye, to remember the past (i.e.
episodic memory) and plan for the future.
Metacognition The awareness and understanding of one’s
own thought processes.
Self-control The ability to delay gratification by resisting
the temptation of an immediate reward in
preference for a better but delayed reward.
Self-recognition The ability to recognise oneself as an
individual separate from the environment
and other individuals.
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Table 2. Complex cognitive abilities that are shared across species. A catalogue of animals that share comparable complex cognitive
abilities. Among these animals, apes and corvids have been tested most frequently. This catalogue is not exhaustive but represents a
subset of studies, and it is important to note that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence
Cognitive ability Evidence across taxa
Episodic-like memory Evidence in apes (Martin-Ordas et al., 2010), rodents (Babb & Crystal, 2006; Ferkin et al., 2008), corvidsa
(Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Zinkivskay, Nazir, & Smulders, 2009), zebrafish (Hamilton et al., 2016), and
cuttlefish (Jozet-Alves, Bertin, & Clayton, 2013).
Self-control Evidence in primates (Beran et al., 1999; Beran, 2002; Evans & Beran, 2007; Anderson, Kuroshima, &
Fujita, 2010), canids (Leonardi, Vick, & Dufour, 2012) (reviewed in MacLean et al., 2014), corvids (Dufour
et al., 2012; Hillemann et al., 2014) and parrots (Auersperg, Laumer, & Bugnyar, 2013; Koepke, Gray, &
Pepperberg, 2015).
Causal and inferential
reasoning
Evidence in primates (Call, 2004, 2007; Bräuer et al., 2006; Schmitt & Fischer, 2009; Seed et al., 2009a; Hill,
Collier-Baker, & Suddendorf, 2011; Heimbauer, Antworth, & Owren, 2012; Marsh & MacDonald, 2012),
elephants (Plotnik et al., 2014), canids (Erdohegyi et al., 2007), corvids (Seed et al., 2006; Smirnova et al., 2015;
Jelbert, Taylor, & Gray, 2015) and parrots (Pepperberg et al., 2013).
Future planning Evidence in apes (Mulcahy & Call, 2006; Osvath & Osvath, 2008; Osvath & Persson, 2013; Bourjade
et al., 2014) and corvids (Clayton et al., 2005; Correia, Dickinson, & Clayton, 2007; Raby et al., 2007; Cheke &
Clayton, 2012; Kabadayi & Osvath, 2017).
Self-recognition Evidence using the mirror-mark test in chimpanzees and orangutans (Suarez & Gallup Jr., 1981; de Veer
et al., 2003; Anderson & Gallup Jr., 2011), dolphins (Reiss & Marino, 2001) elephants (Plotnik et al., 2006),
corvids [Prior, Schwarz, & Güntürkün, 2008; Clary & Kelly, 2016; Buniyaadi, Tahajjul Taufique, &
Kumar, 2020; but see Clary et al., 2020 and Soler et al., 2020 for conflicting evidence], and cleaner wrasse
(Kohda et al., 2018).
Mental attribution Evidence in apes (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Call & Tomasello, 2008; Krupenye et al., 2016) and corvids
(Emery & Clayton, 2001; Bugnyar & Kotrschal, 2002; Emery, Dally, & Clayton, 2004; Dally, Emery, &
Clayton, 2005; Ostojic et al., 2013, 2014, 2017; Bugnyar, Reber, & Buckner, 2016). However, mental
attribution abilities in animals, including humans, remain a contentious idea and are still highly debated
(Davies & Stone, 1995; Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Heyes, 2014, 2015).
aCorvids also exhibit several other behaviours that could be considered hallmarks of an episodic-like memory system including the ability to
produce rich and flexible representations of past events and the ability to prepare for specific events in the future (Jelbert & Clayton, 2017).
Fig 1. Phylogenetic tree depicting the evolutionary relationship between cephalopods and the more commonly studied vertebrates,
corvids, and great apes (image sources: © CCBY-SA: gastropod, echinoderm, chiton, reptile ancestor; © CCBY-NC-ND: cuttlefish;
© CCBYSA-NC: worm ancestor; © jenesesimre, stock.adobe.com: octopus, squid, arthropod, bivalve; © artbalitskiy, stock.adobe.
com: ape, corvid, fish, amphibian, reptile).
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– are cephalopod behaviours underpinned by complex cog-
nition? And, can selective pressures, partially different from
those that shaped intelligence in large-brained vertebrates,
lead to comparable intelligence in cephalopods? The answers
to these questions have far-reaching implications in terms of
understanding cognitive evolution as well as how we investi-
gate animal cognition.
To begin to address these questions, we first review the
range of cognitive attributes that have been demonstrated
in cephalopods. We also present the current reports of beha-
vioural flexibility in cephalopods and provide examples from
other animal groups to demonstrate that flexible behaviours
might be governed by simple cognitive mechanisms rather
than complex cognition.We then refer to comparative cogni-
tion literature to outline experimental methods that could
help to quantify the cognitive mechanisms that underpin
cephalopod behaviours. Finally, we discuss the implications
of using cephalopods as non-traditional models for investi-
gating cognitive evolution.
II. CEPHALOPOD COGNITION
Systematic investigations on the anatomy, physiology, and
behaviour of cephalopods date back to the mid-19th century
(Marini et al., 2017). Since then a wide range of studies has
demonstrated that cephalopods possess a highly developed
nervous system capable of a range of cognitive processes
(Packard, 1972; reviewed in Darmaillacq et al., 2014). Over
the last decade, researchers have provided extensive reviews
of the cognitive attributes demonstrated by cephalopods
(Borrelli & Fiorito, 2008; Amodio & Fiorito, 2013; Darmail-
lacq et al., 2014; Tricarico et al., 2014; Hanlon &
Messenger, 2018). In an effort to avoid redundancy, we will
provide a general overview of cephalopod cognition. This is
not an exhaustive summary and only represents a sub-set of
studies on cephalopod cognition, with a particular focus on
the processes that are thought to be prerequisites for more
complex cognitive abilities. These will be divided into four
categories: sensory perception, perception-based cognition,
learning, and memory.
(1) Sensory perception
Cephalopods are renowned for their dynamic behaviours,
particularly during camouflage and signalling. Their
dynamic lifestyles are often attributed to their large brains
and well-developed sense organs (Budelmann, 1994, 1995).
They have highly developed visual acuity and are sensitive
to polarised light (Shashar, Rutledge, & Cronin, 1996;
Shashar, Milbury, & Hanlon, 2002). Although most species
have been deemed colour-blind (Brown & Brown, 1958;
Marshall & Messenger, 1996; Bellingham, Morris, &
Hunt, 1998), they can discriminate between minute changes
in contrast (Allen, Michels, & Young, 1985; Chaio &
Hanlon, 2001; Mäthger et al., 2006) and are capable of
Fig 2. Examples of octopuses using different objects as dens or
defensive tools. (A, B) Veined octopus, Amphioctopus marginatus, residing
in an abandoned conch shell (A; photograph: © davidevison, stock.
adobe.com), and encased in two halves of a coconut shell (B; photo-
graph: ©MassimoCapodicasa, flickr.com). (C) Sydney common octo-
pus, Octopus tetricus, seeking refuge in a glass jar encrusted by a soft
sponge (photograph: © Peter Godfrey-Smith).
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discriminating between patterns of different size and shape
(Sutherland, 1963; Duval, Chichery, & Chichery, 1984;
Mäthger et al., 2006). Cephalopods also possess sophisticated
chemo-sensory perception. Their suckered arms are
equipped with chemoreceptors (Graziadei, 1962, 1964),
which facilitate a taste-by-touch ability (Wells, 1963), allow-
ing them to avoid self-entanglement (Nesher et al., 2014)
and mediate aggressive and mating behaviours (Cummins
et al., 2011).
(2) Perception-based cognition
Other forms of perception that move beyond the processing
of sensory stimuli have also been demonstrated in cephalo-
pods. For example, cuttlefish are capable of quantity discrim-
ination, also known as number sense. Specifically, a study on
juvenile pharaoh cuttlefish, Sepia pharaonis, showed that they
were able to discriminate between different groups of prey
based on differences in number (Yang & Chiao, 2016). Cut-
tlefish have also been reported to possess lower forms of
object permanence, which is the ability to keep track of
objects that can no longer be perceived (i.e. the object has dis-
appeared from sight) (Sanders & Young, 1940). This cogni-
tive process, in conjunction with working memory, is
critical for rapid decision-making. For instance, many ani-
mals track prey that can hide several times during a single
predation pursuit. To make efficient decisions when hunting,
an animal must encode and remember the location where
the prey was last observed. Object permanence is also
thought to be a vital precursor for mental attribution because
to understand that objects continue to exist even when they
are unseen requires an individual to develop a mental repre-
sentation of the object (Call & Tomasello, 1999; Gruber
et al., 2019).
Another form of perception-based cognition that has been
reported in cephalopods includes lower forms of conception
formation also known as categorisation. Specifically, two-
spot octopuses, Octopus bimaculoides, were trained to differenti-
ate between a combination of shells, whereby choosing the
odd-shaped shell in the sequence resulted in a food reward.
When octopuses were subsequently presented with a new
combination of different stimuli that they had not previously
observed they were able to transfer learning by choosing the
odd stimulus in the new sequence (Boal, 1991). This suggests
that octopuses might be capable of inferential reasoning, a
process that allows individuals to respond flexibly to a variety
of challenges, particularly when faced with new or incom-
plete information.
(3) Learning
Cephalopods are renowned for their various forms of learn-
ing. All cephalopods groups (octopus, cuttlefish, and squid)
have a high capacity for learning through association
(i.e. action X results in outcome Y). For example, both com-
mon cuttlefish, Sepia officinalis, and bobtail squid, Euprymna sco-
lopes, can learn rapidly to inhibit predatory behaviour
through aversive associative learning (Agin et al., 1998,
2006a, 2006b; Zepeda, Veline, & Crook, 2017). Day octo-
puses, Octopus cyanea, can learn to associate a neutral stimulus
with a rewarded unconditioned stimulus (i.e. food) through
appetitive conditioning (Papini & Bitterman, 1991). More-
over, common cuttlefish can learn to associate a specific prey
item with a negative outcome through rapid taste aversion
learning (i.e. prey were coated with a quinine-based solution
making it bitter) (Darmaillacq et al., 2004).
Cephalopods show a high capacity for discrimination
learning and can be taught to make a wide variety of both
visual and tactile discriminations (Hvorecny et al., 2007; Bor-
relli & Fiorito, 2008; Darmaillacq et al., 2014). Cephalopods
are also capable of reversal learning, whereby an individual is
required first to learn to associate a reward with one of two
different stimuli that differ in some visual feature and then
subsequently to learn to associate a reward with the alterna-
tive stimulus (i.e. discrimination reversal) (Boycott &
Young, 1957). Moreover, studies on octopuses, in particular,
have revealed that they can perform multiple reversals
(Mackintosh, 1964; Mackintosh & Mackintosh, 1963, 1964;
but see Bublitz et al., 2017).
Cephalopods also possess advanced spatial learning
abilities, including exploratory learning and spatial maze
learning (Mather, 1991; Forsythe & Hanlon, 1997; Boal
et al., 2000a; Karson, Boal, & Hanlon, 2003; Jozet-Alves,
Boal, & Dickel, 2008). For example, two-spot octopuses
can use spatial cues to locate shelter in an unfamiliar
arena. Most octopuses demonstrated spatial learning in a
single day and were able to retain the information over
seven days (Boal et al., 2000a). Common cuttlefish locate
shelter in a maze by relying on both proximal and distal
visual cues, as well as polarised light vectors (reviewed in
Jozet-Alves et al., 2008). While, cuttlefish use both vertical
and horizontal spatial cues, they show a preference for ver-
tical information over horizontal information (Scatà
et al., 2016).
Social learning has been reported in the common octo-
pus, Octopus vulgaris, whereby naïve octopuses were able
to solve a colour discrimination task by first observing a
conspecific demonstrator (Fiorito & Scotto, 1992). By con-
trast, studies on cuttlefish have reported that learning does
not improve by observing conspecifics (Boal, Witten-
berg, & Hanlon, 2000b; Huang & Chiao, 2013). It should
be noted that the findings from the Fiorito & Scotto (1992)
study have not been replicated and this study has since
been criticised for lacking controls to determine whether
the octopuses were indeed learning through observation
or alternative mechanisms (Biederman & Davey, 1993).
The findings also led to a debate about the adaptive func-
tion of observational learning mechanisms in solitary spe-
cies, given that they were traditionally assumed to be an
adaptive trait of social living. It has since been suggested
that alternative mechanisms such as perception, attention,
and motivation might facilitate the capacity for social
learning (Lefebvre & Giraldeau, 1996; Heyes, 2012).
While the capacity for social learning in octopuses is
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theoretically plausible, more experiments are needed to
test the robustness of the original finding. Perhaps a more
suitable candidate for this line of enquiry is the Caribbean
reef squid, Sepioteuthis sepioidea. These squid are gregarious
with typical shoals ranging from 10 to 30 individuals of
varying age, providing potential opportunities for individ-
uals to learn from conspecifics through observation
(Moynihan & Rodaniche, 1982; Mather, 2010).
The range of different forms of learning demonstrated in
cephalopods is impressive but many of these are governed
by associative learning mechanisms and need not involve
complex cognition. Moreover, similar forms of learning have
been reported in diverse taxa that transcend large-brained
vertebrates such as insects (reviewed in Giurfa, 2015; Buatois
et al., 2018), fish (Kendal et al., 2009; Pike et al., 2010; Brown
et al., 2011; White et al., 2017) and reptiles (Paradis &
Cabanac, 2004; Noble, Carao, & Whiting, 2012; Kis,
Huber, & Wilkinson, 2014).
(4) Memory
There are many studies on cephalopods that demonstrate the
extent of memory recall and the effect of memory impair-
ment induced by experimental interference (reviewed in
Sanders, 1975; Wells, 1978). Classic studies by Sanders &
Young (1940) and Schiller (1949) demonstrate that both
octopuses and cuttlefish have short- and long-term memory.
Long-term memory has also been reported in squid (Allen
et al., 1985; Zepeda et al., 2017). Moreover, in long-term
memory studies, the memory trace was reported to last a long
time, up to weeks and even months (Boal, 1991; Fiorito &
Scotto, 1992).
Many of the traditional studies onmemory centre on asses-
sing whether individuals can learn patterns and solve a prob-
lem by applying these learnt associations. Such studies often
involve multiple training trials and do not test complex forms
of memory that transcend learning through association.
However, one study has shown that cuttlefish are capable of
a complex form of memory that does not solely rely on asso-
ciative learning but rather on the recollection of a specific
event or situation based on what happened, where, and when
(Tulving, 1972). Specifically, common cuttlefish can optimise
their foraging behaviour using episodic-like memory, by
remembering what they had eaten, where they had eaten it,
and how long ago (Jozet-Alves et al., 2013). Episodic-like
memory (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998) is an important
component of mental time travel and is considered to be
a precursor for future planning, as it functions as a data-
base to predict future scenarios (Clayton, Bussey, &
Dickinson, 2003; Schacter et al., 2012). Current research
on cuttlefish shows that they can rapidly adjust their forag-
ing behaviour by integrating information about past expe-
riences as well as proximate-future expectations
(i.e. expectations learnt across time). However, whether
cuttlefish are capable of future planning – spontaneously
planning without relying on learnt patterns – is yet to be
tested.
III. BEHAVIOURAL FLEXIBILITY IN
CEPHALOPODS
The suite of cognitive attributes exhibited by cephalopods
has likely facilitated their remarkable behavioural flexibility,
enabling them innovatively to modify their behaviour within
various foraging, anti-predatory, and mating contexts
(Hanlon &Messenger, 2018; Schnell & Clayton, 2019; Amo-
dio et al., 2019a).
(1) Flexible foraging strategies
Similar to apes and corvids, cephalopods exhibit a variety of
flexible foraging strategies (Amodio et al., 2019a). For exam-
ple, octopuses avoid visiting the same foraging areas that they
depleted of resources (i.e. benthic prey such as bivalves and
gastropods) during previous visits (Mather, 1991; Forsythe &
Hanlon, 1997). This suggests that octopuses update their
memory flexibly to optimise their foraging behaviour. Fur-
thermore, various octopus species use extractive foraging
strategies to remove their preferred prey (i.e. crustaceans
and bivalves) from its protective armour (Anderson &
Mather, 2007). They either pry open the hard encasings
using their suckered arms or drill holes through the shell
and inject their prey with paralysing toxins (Fiorito &
Gherardi, 1999; Blustein & Anderson, 2016). While extrac-
tive foraging appears to be confined to octopuses, cuttlefish
have developed alternative strategies to optimise their forag-
ing behaviour. A recent study on the foraging behaviour of
common cuttlefish demonstrated that they adapt quickly to
changes in their environment using previous experience.
Specifically, cuttlefish dynamically change their foraging
strategies in response to changes in prey availability and
proximate-future expectations (Billard, Clayton, & Jozet-
Alves, 2020a). Furthermore, mimic octopuses, Thaumoctopus
sp., have been observed disguising themselves as flounders
(Hanlon, Conroy, & Forsythe, 2008; Hanlon, Watson, &
Barbosa, 2010) and other species of octopus and cuttlefish
have been observed disguising themselves as crawling hermit
crabs (Huffard, 2007; Okamoto et al., 2017), which might
serve as mimicry to optimise foraging behaviour. Pharaoh
cuttlefish, in particular, exhibit this disguise whilst hunting,
allegedly to catch more prey (Okamoto et al., 2017).
(2) Flexible anti-predatory strategies
The anti-predatory behaviours of cephalopods are perhaps
the most iconic evidence of their behavioural flexibility.
While many animals use camouflage to conceal themselves
from predators, cephalopod camouflage is unique because
they can change the pattern of their skin within milliseconds
(Hanlon, 2007). Chromatophore organs in the skin under the
direct neuromuscular control of the brain (Messenger, 2001),
enable the individual to change its appearance dynamically
and rapidly. For example, both cuttlefish and squid can
change their body patterns flexibly in response to the per-
ceived threat of approaching fish species that differ in their
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predatory strategies (Moynihan & Rodaniche, 1982;
Hanlon & Messenger, 1988; Mather, 2010; Staudinger,
Hanlon, & Juanes, 2011; Staudinger et al., 2013; Hanlon &
McManus, 2020). Some researchers have suggested that
squid produce these species-specific responses by perceiving
the mental states of the approaching predator, leading to
claims of mental attribution (Mather & Ward, 2013;
Mather & Dickel, 2017). The same authors suggest that octo-
puses, cuttlefish, and squid use causal reasoning to select spe-
cific skin patterns for particular targets (Mather &
Dickel, 2017). However, these claims remain tenuous with-
out conducting experiments to rule out whether these behav-
iours are underpinned by simpler cognitive mechanisms.
Nevertheless, research has recently demonstrated that cam-
ouflage in cuttlefish is not simply hardwired, but rather can
be shaped by associative learning and individual experience
(Hough, Case, & Boal, 2016). These findings suggest that
the anti-predatory strategies exhibited by cephalopods
involve learning and require decision-making guided by
prior experiences.
In addition to camouflage, cephalopods use masquerade to dis-
guise themselves as inanimate objects potentially to evade predation.
For instance, some species of octopus and cuttlefishmodify both skin
patterning, texture, and body posture to disguise themselves asmov-
ing algae or a rock (Hanlon, Forsythe, & Joneschild, 1999;
Huffard, 2006; Panetta, Buresch, & Hanlon, 2017). The tiny two-
toned pygmy squid, Idiosepius pygmaeus, use a dorsal adhesive organ
to attach themselves to the underside of blades of seagrass
(Natsukari, 1970; Norman, 2000), where they float in a head-down
position resembling floating algae, seagrass, and flotsam
(Moynihan, 1983). Some species of octopus have been observed
using defensivemimicry,whereby theymimic inedible, unappetising
or venomous animals to deceive predators. Specifically, there have
been reports of octopuses disguising themselves as small sponges
(Hanlon et al., 2008), flounder (Norman, Finn, & Tregenza, 2001;
Hanlon et al., 2008; Hanlon et al., 2010), lionfish, and banded sea
snakes (Norman et al., 2001). Caribbean reef squid have also been
observed using defensive mimicry, exhibiting body patterns that
strikingly resembleparrotfish,Scarus taenipterus, foundon the samereef
(Moynihan & Rodaniche, 1982).
Other remarkable anti-predatory strategies reported
among octopuses include defensive tool-use (Fig. 2). A com-
mon octopus was recently featured in the BBC Blue Planet II
series using its suckered arms to gather and create a protec-
tive armour of shells and stones to protect itself from hunting
sharks (Jeffs & Brownlow, 2017). Veined octopuses can utilise
coconut shells as mobile dens (Finn et al., 2009) (Fig. 2B), and
various other species (e.g. Octopus joubini, O. digueti, O. tetricus,
O. vulgaris) have been observed collecting bivalve and conch
shells as well as other objects (e.g. plastic or glass bottles),
transporting them, and using them as defensive tools
(Ambrose, 1983; Mather, 1994) (Fig. 2).
(3) Flexible mating strategies
Cephalopods also use their ability to change their appear-
ance rapidly to communicate visually with conspecifics
(Moynihan, 1985; Lin, Tsai, & Chaio, 2017; Hanlon &
Messenger, 2018). Many species produce dynamic displays
to convey specific messages and they can use these in a flexi-
ble manner. Such flexibility facilitates rapid communication
particularly during breeding. For example, male giant
Australian cuttlefish, Sepia apama, produce multiple displays,
performed in succession to convey increasing levels of threat
(Schnell et al., 2016). The dynamic nature of cephalopod
communication also facilitates flexible mating strategies,
which are often dependent on size. For instance, many squid
species, including Sepioteuthis sepioidea, Doryteuthis pealei and
Loligo reynaudii, vary greatly in size at sexual maturity. Larger
males usually produce aggressive displays and defend females
vigorously, whereas smaller ‘sneaker’males attempt to obtain
extra-pair copulations (Moynihan & Rodaniche, 1982;
Hanlon, Smale, & Sauer, 1994, 2002; Hanlon, Maxwell, &
Shashar, 1997; Shashar & Hanlon, 2013; Naud
et al., 2016). Interestingly, small males can switch rapidly
between aggressive and sneaker tactics in response to the size
of nearby rival males (Hanlon et al., 1997). This demonstrates
that the behaviour is facultative, which requires flexible and
fast decision-making.
The dynamic communication system of cephalopods also
facilitates the rapid production of deceptive signals. For
example, at sexual maturity, male giant Australian cuttlefish
range between 15 and 60 cm in mantle length. Large and
medium-sized males frequently engage in fighting and com-
pete over females using aggressive and defensive behaviours.
Small males engage in similar behaviours but if a larger rival
male is nearby, they avoid fights through deceptive signal-
ling, whereby they change their appearance both in colour
and posture to mimic a female cuttlefish (Norman, Finn, &
Tregenza, 1999; Hall & Hanlon, 2002; Hanlon et al., 2005).
Some species of cephalopod are able to convey honest and
deceptive signals simultaneously. For instance, mourning
cuttlefish, Sepia plangon, can produce a courtship display
towards a female on one side of their body while displaying
female patterning on the other side of their body towards a
rival male, presumably in an attempt to prevent the rival
from interfering with their courtship behaviour (Brown,
Garwood, & Williamson, 2012). Sexual mimicry has also
been observed in female opalescent squid, Doryteuthis opales-
cens. To deter mating attempts from males, females can
mimic the appearance of a male by flashing a white stripe
down part of their body, which mimics the approximate size,
colour, and position of testes on male squid (DeMartini
et al., 2013). Like sexual mimicry in male cuttlefish, this tran-
sient behaviour appears to be facultative and only performed
by female squid under specific conditions. Transient sexual
mimicry in cephalopods has been described as a form of tac-
tical deception (Brown et al., 2012). In primates and corvids,
tactical deception is thought to be governed by the ability of
an individual to infer that the perspective of a rival might be
different from their own (i.e. mental attribution) (Bugnyar &
Kotrschal, 2002; Kirkpatrick, 2011). However, whether the
same cognitive abilities govern sexual mimicry in cephalo-
pods remains to be tested.
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IV. BEHAVIOURAL FLEXIBILITY – EVIDENCE
OF COMPLEX COGNITION?
The link between behavioural flexibility and complex cogni-
tion has not been systematically or explicitly demonstrated
(Mikhalevich et al., 2017). Such a demonstration is particu-
larly important because although flexible behaviours might
appear to be sophisticated at a superficial level, an animal
might be relying on simple cognitive ‘shortcuts’ that do not
require complex cognitive mechanisms (Mikhalevich
et al., 2017). Moreover, sophisticated behavioural phenom-
ena observed in different animals that appear to be similar
may be underpinned by different cognitive mechanisms that
vary in complexity. For example, over 200 vertebrate species
cache food items in different locations and retrieve them at a
later date (Vander Wall, 1990; Sutton, Strickland, &
Norris, 2016). This is a flexible behaviour because caching
and retrieval can be modified in response to different situa-
tions. Furthermore, caching is a future-orientated behaviour
because the only advantage of caching in the present is the
prospect of obtaining food in the future. However, the under-
lying cognitive mechanisms that drive this behaviour can dif-
fer substantially across species. For corvids, caching
behaviour involves complex cognitive abilities including
episodic-like memory, future planning, and mental attribu-
tion. Specifically, California scrub-jays Aphelocoma californica,
use episodic-like memory to retrieve food discriminately
depending on the perishability of the cached item in conjunc-
tion with information about what they cached, where, and
when (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998). Caching decisions are
also based on future-planning abilities in terms of planning
what they would like to eat in the future (i.e. caching what
they would like to eat for breakfast; Raby et al., 2007), inde-
pendent of their current motivational state (i.e. food they
would like to eat in the present moment; Correia
et al., 2007; Cheke & Clayton, 2012). Finally, different corvid
species respond to the presence of competitors by re-hiding
caches in new places in an effort to reduce theft by pilfering
conspecifics, suggesting that they incorporate an attribution
of others’ knowledge into their caching strategies (Emery &
Clayton, 2001; Bugnyar & Kotrschal, 2002; Emery
et al., 2004; Dally et al., 2005; Dally, Emery, &
Clayton, 2006). By contrast, a study on fox squirrels, Sciurus
niger, showed that caching behaviour appears to be a hard-
wired predisposition, triggered by an environmental cue,
such as food availability or the number of social competitors
(Preston & Jacobs, 2009). These examples demonstrate how
apparently comparable behaviours, in different species, can
be driven by different cognitive mechanisms that vary in their
degree of complexity. Consequently, when investigating
complex cognition, in the absence of empirical tests that con-
trol for the possibility of simpler explanations, researchers
should take a cautious approach when interpreting cognitive
mechanisms that drive behaviours and apply Occam’s razor,
which states that the simpler explanation for a phenomenon
should be favoured over a more complex hypothesis.
V. QUANTIFYING COMPLEX COGNITION:
LESSONS FROM COMPARATIVE COGNITION
Distinguishing whether a specific behaviour is underpinned
by complex cognition or is solely governed by simpler cogni-
tive mechanisms is challenging, particularly when investigat-
ing non-verbal subjects. Fortunately, the field of comparative
cognition centres on designing methods based on standar-
dised behavioural criteria that are not dependent on lan-
guage and thus facilitate the assessment of cognitive abilities
in non-verbal animals. Here we consider the use of beha-
vioural criteria as standardised yet adaptable measures of
complex cognition.
Pinpointing the underlying cognitive mechanisms that
drive behaviours is a stratified procedure involving multiple
steps. As a starting point, it is necessary to identify ecologi-
cally relevant behaviours that are putatively complex. For
instance, many species of corvids cache between 5000 and
11,000 different food items that vary in perishability, store
them in different locations and retrieve them at a later date
(Chettleburgh, 1952; de Kort & Clayton, 2006). Remember-
ing the location of thousands of caches that vary in perishabil-
ity and whose degradation rates may vary depending on the
substrate in which they are cached, as well as the climate con-
ditions between caching and cache recovery, is likely to have
favoured the emergence of sophisticated memory and future-
planning abilities (Clayton, Griffiths, & Dickinson, 2000). By
linking cognitive abilities to specific socio-ecological chal-
lenges experienced in the wild, researchers can begin to
develop hypotheses about the evolutionary pressures that
contributed to the positive selection of these abilities
(Gerlai & Clayton, 1999; Clayton et al., 2000). The next step
is to develop behavioural criteria which serve as non-verbal
indicators to demonstrate that the animal possesses some
aspects of the cognitive ability in question. One of the most
noteworthy examples is the development of behavioural cri-
teria to test for episodic-like memory in food-caching jays.
Pioneered by Clayton & Dickinson (1998), the researchers
presented jays with a caching problem that could only be
solved if they could remember the what–where–when com-
ponents of a specific past caching event. The same beha-
vioural criteria have since been used to demonstrate that
distantly related taxa from human children (Russell
et al., 2011) and non-human apes (Martin-Ordas
et al., 2010) to rodents (Babb & Crystal, 2006) are also capa-
ble of solving foraging tasks using episodic-like memory. The
final step is to rule out the possibility of alternative explana-
tions for the observed behavioural phenomenon. To achieve
this, the design of the experiment needs to be scaffolded with
a series of interventionist manipulations that control for pre-
dictor variables that might influence the animal’s behaviour.
Controlling for confounding effects on cognition are best
achieved in laboratory environments because field-based
studies are typically vulnerable to external influences
(Shettleworth, 2010; Janmaat, 2019). Nevertheless, we
encourage researchers to complement laboratory-based
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studies by also observing and testing animals in the field. A
combination of both laboratory and field studies will help cir-
cumvent several key issues such as the measurement of fitness
benefits in cognition because the adaptive value of a specific
cognitive ability will ultimately depend on the environmental
context (Cauchoix & Chaine, 2016).
To appreciate the utility of the methods developed in com-
parative cognition research, we now consider an example
pertaining to cephalopod cognition. This example is aimed
at investigating whether cuttlefish can optimise their foraging
behaviour by planning for the future. In the wild, cuttlefish
have long rest periods where they remain stationary and
camouflaged (Aitken, O’Dor, & Jackson, 2005). Such periods
are punctuated by brief foraging bouts in the open, which
require effective foraging strategies. Using methods devised
in comparative cognition research, several studies have dem-
onstrated that cuttlefish can optimise their foraging behav-
iour by using sophisticated memory and future-oriented
feeding strategies. Researchers could thus conclude that cut-
tlefish use episodic-like memory to search for prey discrimi-
nately depending on what they had previously eaten, where
their previous meal had been sourced and how much time
had elapsed since their previous meal (Jozet-Alves
et al., 2013).
Such findings were validated in a subsequent study that
showed that cuttlefish were able to retrieve specific features
of episodic memories, a capacity referred to as source mem-
ory. Specifically, cuttlefish were able to adjust their foraging
behaviour by retrieving perceptual features that were tied
to the source of a previous foraging event, namely whether
they had seen the prey item or smelt it (Billard
et al., 2020a). Another study found that cuttlefish can adjust
their foraging behaviour rapidly in response to changing
prey conditions. Cuttlefish were able to learn and remem-
ber patterns of food availability to ensure simultaneously
that they have enough to eat whilst also prioritising meals
to consume more of their preferred prey (Billard
et al., 2020b). This dynamic feeding pattern is described as
a future-oriented behaviour because the decision-making
processes involved are influenced by previous experience
and proximate-future expectations. However, at this stage,
we cannot validate whether this future-oriented behaviour
in cuttlefish is also governed by the ability to plan for the
future.
To determine whether cuttlefish can optimise their forag-
ing behaviour by planning for the future, three important
abilities involved in future planning need to be quantified.
The first is self-control, a vital cognitive skill that underpins
future planning because an individual must overcome imme-
diate gratification to fulfil future needs. The second ability is
the capacity to anticipate and plan for the future in a novel
context, thereby ruling out the possibility that the future-
oriented decision-making is based on the application of
learnt patterns (Clayton et al., 2003). Finally, the third ability
is the capacity to dissociate current and future mental states
because to anticipate and plan for future needs an individual
must be able to recognise that their future needs might differ
from their current desires (i.e. Bischof–Köhler hypothesis;
Clayton et al., 2003).
To test for self-control, cuttlefish could be presented with a
delayed gratification task similar to the pioneering Stanford
Marshmallow test, which was used to test for self-control in
children (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989) and has since
been applied to non-human animal models (reviewed in
Miller et al., 2019). This test requires an individual to choose
between two food items, an immediate but less-preferred
food item versus a delayed but preferred food item. A key part
of the process is to ensure that the individual’s decision to
wait for the delayed but preferred option truly reflects self-
control.
To illustrate this process, consider that some delayed-
gratification studies have been criticised for not reliably mea-
suring true self-control due to methodological limitations.
For example, many experimental designs do not test whether
an individual can sustain continuous inhibition of impulsive
responses to the immediate food item (Paglieri et al., 2013).
In particular, studies on bees (Cheng et al., 2002), birds
(Chelonis et al., 1994; Mazur, 2007) and mammals (Tobin,
Chelonis, & Logue, 1993; Tobin et al., 1996; Rosati
et al., 2007; Addessi, Paglieri, & Focaroli, 2011) have pre-
sented animals with delayed gratification tasks where the
choice is irrevocable and thus once the choice is made the
individual cannot alter their decision during the trial. This
only tests an individual’s willingness to attempt to delay grat-
ification but fails to test whether the individual can sustain the
inhibition to acquire the better but delayed reward. To over-
come this limitation, it is important to allow the subject to dis-
continue waiting at any point to consume the less-preferred
food item, which should remain visible and accessible
throughout the trial.
To test for future-planning abilities, cuttlefish could be
presented with a ‘planning for breakfast’ paradigm similar
to the experiments conducted on scrub-jays (Raby
et al., 2007). This paradigm tested whether the birds could
make provisions for a future need when tested in a novel con-
text that eliminated the possibility that their decision was
based on previously learnt patterns. Specifically, the birds
experienced a hungry room, where breakfast was never pro-
vided; and a breakfast room, where breakfast was always pro-
vided. Over 6 days, the birds were exposed to each room
randomly and during this time food was provided in a middle
room, which acted as a corridor between the hungry and
breakfast room. The food in the middle room was provided
in powdered form, negating any opportunity to carry it away
and cache it. Following this exposure, the birds were pro-
vided with nuts in the middle room and caching trays were
placed in both the hungry and the breakfast room, providing
them with the opportunity to cache food in either room. The
results showed that the birds cached up to five times more in
the trays in the hungry room than the ones in the breakfast
room (Raby et al., 2007). A key part of the design of this
experiment was to ensure that the subjects were not simply
responding to changing conditions by applying learnt
patterns, in other words, through associative learning.
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To control for this, the birds were unable to cache food items
during the exposure period, and thus the option to cache
during the novel test period was spontaneous and had not
been previously associated with punishment or a reward
(Raby et al., 2007).
A similar experiment could be designed for cuttlefish.
Instead of caching behaviour as the response variable, the
focus could instead be shifted to searching or hunting behav-
iour. To fulfil the behavioural criteria of anticipating and
planning for the future, cuttlefish would be required to pref-
erentially increase searching and hunting behaviour in the
hungry room compared to the breakfast room. However,
these results alone cannot validate whether cuttlefish can
act independently of their current motivational state.
To test whether cuttlefish can dissociate between current
and future states, a follow-up study could be conducted using
specific satiety to control for the cuttlefish’s current state.
Specific satiety is achieved by feeding an individual one type
of food (e.g. food A) for a period; this usually results in a tem-
porary decline in desire for food A and instead the individual
prefers to consume a different type of food (e.g. food B). A
similar study was conducted on scrub-jays, whereby the birds
were pre-fed one food type (food A) and immediately after
this period each subject was allowed to choose between two
food items to cache: food A or a different food type (food B)
(Correia et al., 2007). Immediately prior to the point of cache
recovery, the birds were also offered one of the two food types
(food A or B). Results showed that the birds chose to cache
the food that they would not have access to in the future
regardless of the food type that they had been pre-fed
(i.e. were satiated on) (Correia et al., 2007; Cheke &
Clayton, 2012). This demonstrated that they could dissociate
between their current and future motivational states, and
even plan for two alternative future states (Cheke &
Clayton, 2012). This example highlights the rigorous mea-
sures and interventions that must be implemented to provide
substantiated evidence to demonstrate that foraging behav-
iour in cuttlefish is governed by future planning.
VI. ADVANTAGES OF A CEPHALOPOD MODEL
The current range of model species in comparative cognition
literature has made it difficult to uncouple the effects of eco-
logical and social pressures on cognitive evolution since many
of the species studied face both challenges. For example,
scrub-jays solve the ecological challenge of retrieving previ-
ously stored food caches that may or may not degrade by
using episodic-like memory (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998).
Yet, in the presence of other scrub-jays, they also face the
social challenge of outwitting conspecifics to ensure or at least
maximise the chance that their caches are not stolen (Clayton
et al., 2007). Consequently, predominately investigating
social species that face comparable ecological challenges
makes it difficult to determine the weight of each effect. Fur-
thermore, the idea that social complexity selects for intelli-
gence has a controversial history as several studies have
reported findings inconsistent with the Social Intelligence
Hypothesis (Holekamp, 2007; DeCasien, Williams, &
Higham, 2017). For example, great apes live in social groups
that are comparable in size and complexity to monkey socie-
ties, yet only apes exhibit sophistication during cognitive tasks
such as learning through imitation and mental attribution
(Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001; Call & Tomasello, 2008;
Krupenye & Call, 2019). In a similar vein, Clark’s nut-
crackers, Nucifraga columbiana, outperformMexican jays, Aphe-
locoma wollweberi, during spatial memory tasks even though
the latter are more social (Kamil, Balda, & Olson, 1994;
Olson et al., 1995; Bednekoff et al., 1997). The conflicting evi-
dence generated from these vertebrate comparative studies
highlights the need for novel comparisons that extend
Table 3. Comparisons between the vertebrate and the cephalopod brain
Vertebrate brain Cephalopod brain
Structure The hippocampal formation is a major component of the
vertebrate brain and is implicated in learning, memory,
and spatial navigation (Krebs et al., 1989; Sherry
et al., 1989; Doeller, King, & Burgess, 2008; Allen &
Fortin, 2013).
Cephalopods have a vertical lobe complex that has been
compared to the hippocampus of vertebrates, with
similarities in cognitive function, connectivity and
neurochemistry (Young, 1971; Nixon & Young, 2003;
Shomrat et al., 2015).
Organisation The vertebrate brain is divided into left and right
hemispheres, composed of five lobes and is predominately
organised somatotopically (i.e. movements of the body
correspond to a specific point in the central nervous
system) (Sanes & Schiebert, 2001).
The cephalopod brain does not have obvious left and right
hemispheres, is composed of series of ganglia that form
30–40 lobes (Young, 1971; Zullo & Hochner, 2011) and
has been suggested to use embodied organisation (i.e.
movements are controlled by several parallel overlapping
circuits representing individual motor programs)
(Hochner, 2012; Levy & Hochner, 2017).
Patterns of
connectivity
The hemispheres and lobes are interconnected by
commissures, which are highly conserved in the brains of
vertebrates (Suárez, Gobius, & Richards, 2014).
The lobes are interconnected by commissures and tracts
that create a high degree of crosstalk between the lobes,
but the patterns of connectivity are less elaborate than
those found in the vertebrate brain (Young, 1971).
Biological Reviews (2020) 000–000 © 2020 The Authors. Biological Reviews published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Cambridge Philosophical Society.
How intelligent is a cephalopod? 11
current research to diverse species, specifically to species that
perform sophisticated behaviours but have been exposed to
different forms and/or degrees of ecological and social
pressures.
The emergence of intelligence in the animal kingdom has
also been attributed to several fundamental characteristics
that are shared across apes, corvids, and parrots
(Emery, 2006; Seed et al., 2009b; Wirthlin et al., 2018). These
include (i) a highly omnivorous diet allowing individuals to
meet the high energetic demands of maintaining a large
brain, (ii) a long developmental period allowing them more
opportunities to learn essential skills, and (iii) extended lon-
gevity. However, the influence of each of these characteristics
on the evolution of complex cognition cannot be determined
by investigating animals that possess all of these features,
rather comparative investigations need to be expanded to
animal groups with diverse life histories.
Cephalopods are suitable candidates to circumvent some
of the current limitations in the literature for several reasons.
First, cephalopods perform a wide range of flexible behav-
iours to meet both ecological and social challenges, many of
which have the potential to be underpinned by complex cog-
nitive abilities. Second, cephalopods are widely distributed
and are thus exposed to highly variable ecological pressures
(Hanlon & Messenger, 2018). They can, therefore, be used
to investigate specific ecological factors that select for the evo-
lution of specific cognitive abilities. Third, cephalopods also
exhibit varying levels of ‘simplified’ sociality, defined here
as sociality that does not require recognition or cooperation.
Within the cephalopods, social organisation ranges from sol-
itary octopuses to aggregating cuttlefish during times of
breeding to shoaling squids that school for most of their adult
lives (Hanlon & Messenger, 2018; Schnell & Clayton, 2019).
An extensive set of phylogenetically controlled comparisons
might highlight the effects of low and high levels of social
organisation on cognitive evolution.
Using cephalopods as a non-traditional model to investi-
gate cognitive evolution is also likely to provide valuable
insights into the key characteristics required to support the
emergence of complex cognition because they diverged from
the vertebrate lineage over 550 million years ago. The com-
mon ancestor of cephalopods and vertebrates was substan-
tially more rudimentary than the common ancestor of birds
and mammals and likely resembled a wormlike creature with
a simple nervous system (Fig. 1). Consequently, cephalopods
deviate drastically from vertebrates and thus exhibit signifi-
cantly different characteristics from the more commonly
studied large-brained vertebrates. Specifically, they have a
highly carnivorous diet, a brief developmental period, and
reduced longevity. Comparative data between cephalopods
and the more traditionally studied vertebrates will thus pro-
vide a quantum leap in our understanding of the influences
of different characteristics that have facilitated the evolution
of intelligent behaviour.
Cephalopods also have significantly different brain struc-
ture, organisation, and patterns of connectivity from verte-
brates (Table 3) (Young, 1971; Wells, 1978; Budelmann,
Schipp, & Boletzky, 1997; Nixon & Young, 2003). These dif-
ferences are more pronounced than brain divergence
between corvids and mammals. However, due to encephali-
sation of the ganglionic masses (i.e. nerve cell clusters), the
cephalopod brain is more similar to the vertebrate brain than
to the ganglionic chain of its molluscan relatives (i.e. bivalves
and gastropods) (Young, 1971; Hochner, Shomrat, &
Fiorito, 2006). Moreover, certain areas of the cephalopod
brain show strikingly similar morphological organisation to
the vertebrate brain and mediate similar functions
(Hochner et al., 2006). For example, the cephalopod cerebral
cord, also known as the cerebral ganglion, is analogous to the
vertebrate forebrain and midbrain, the cephalopod frontal-
vertical lobe is comparable to the vertebrate cerebral cortex
and hippocampal formation, and the palliovisceral and pedal
cords in the cephalopod brain are comparable to the hind-
brain and spinal cord in vertebrates (Young, 1991; Shigeno
et al., 2015, 2018).
The vertebrate-like functions of the cephalopod brain,
coupled with their behavioural flexibility, make cephalo-
pods a prime non-traditional candidate for investigating
the evolution of complex cognition. Moreover, juxtaposing
cephalopods with vertebrates, whose cognition has arisen
independently through partially different evolutionary
pressures, allows us to move beyond the impasses in com-
parative cognition that have resulted from traditional com-
parisons among vertebrate species. Comparative
evaluations between cephalopods and vertebrates will thus
provide a unique opportunity to determine whether certain
sophisticated behaviours are underpinned by comparable
cognitive sophistication, and by extrapolation, whether
such sophistication evolved via concurrent processes of
divergent brain evolution and convergent cognitive
evolution.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
(1) This review provides a general overview of the cognitive
attributes of cephalopods, some of which are thought to be
vital prerequisites for complex cognition.
(2) We also review the behavioural flexibility exhibited by
cephalopods and use examples from other taxa to explain
that behavioural flexibility per se cannot be used as evidence
of complex cognition.
(3) We outline experimental methods from the field of
comparative cognition to emphasise the importance of mea-
suring underlying cognitive mechanisms that govern behav-
iours before labelling them as cognitively complex.
(4) By applying similar experimental designs to investigate
cephalopod cognition we can begin to develop a more com-
prehensive reconstruction of cognitive evolution.
(5) Identifying shared cognitive abilities between cephalo-
pods and distantly related taxa will reveal whether divergent
neural architectures can support comparable sophisticated
cognition.
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(6) At the same time, juxtaposing cephalopods with dis-
tantly related taxa will help us understand the degree to
which different selective pressures have influenced the emer-
gence of intelligence. If comparable cognitive traits among
diverse groups are found, then this will elucidate that intelli-
gence can evolve independently through different evolution-
ary pathways.
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